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Introduction 
“Nemo judex in causa sua,” we are told: no one should be a judge in their own case. But while this 
may be a good rule to follow in legal proceedings, its epistemic analogue would be harder to uphold. 
In fact, we’re often put in a position where we have no choice but to judge our own epistemic 
performance. We’re put in this sort of position when, for example, we form the opinion that a 
female candidate’s qualifications are slightly less good than her male competitor’s—while aware of 
strong evidence that we’re likely to undervalue women’s CVs relative to men’s. Or when we form an 
opinion about the results of some economic policy that’s tightly connected to our passionate 
political views—while aware of strong evidence that political passions frequently distort people’s 
reasoning on this type of matter. A small-plane pilot is put in this position when she’s deciding 
whether she has enough fuel to make it to an airport a bit further away than her original destination, 
while aware that her altitude makes it likely that she’s affected by hypoxia, which notoriously affects 
this sort of judgment while leaving its victims feeling totally clear-headed. A medical resident is put 
in this positon when he forms an opinion about the appropriate drug dosage for a patient, while 
aware of strong evidence that he’s been awake so long that his thinking about appropriate dosages is 
likely to be degraded. And many of us are put in this position when we form an opinion on some 
controversial issue while aware that others—who share our evidence and who seem as likely as we 
are to form accurate beliefs on the basis of such evidence—have reached a contrary opinion.  
If we’re serious about forming accurate opinions in any of these cases, it would seem that we 
must take seriously the evidence of our possible epistemic malfunction. This means, in the first 
place, assessing our likely reliability on the matter in question. And in many cases, it will also involve 
using that assessment to modify our confidence about the matter in question. I will assume here that 
this is true even in cases where our direct thinking about the matter in question happens to be 
perfectly fine—when it hasn’t actually been distorted by sexism, political passion, or fatigue. So, for 
instance, even if a sleep-deprived medical resident has in fact figured out the dosage for his patient 
correctly, his confidence that the dosage is correct should be lowered by his knowledge of the 
cognitive effects of fatigue.1 
I want to look here at the first step—the assessment of one’s own cognitive reliability—, 
which is where the awkwardness of acting as judge in one’s own case arises. It seems clear that one 
must base this assessment on one’s evidence, and that one must use one’s own cognitive faculties to 
1 Though many would agree, this is not an uncontroversial assumption; for dissent, see, e.g., Kelly (2005), Lasonen-
Aarnio (2014), or Titelbaum (2015).  
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do so. And it seems clear that the evidence on which this reliability assessment is based will often 
include evidence about the specific situation one is in: It’s our medical resident’s evidence that he’s 
fatigued today that requires his estimate of his own reliability to be lowered. And knowing whether 
my disagreeing friend is drunk or not now affects the degree to which her disagreement is evidence 
against the reliability of my thinking about the disputed issue. 
 But some ways of invoking situation-specific reliability evidence don’t seem kosher—
precisely because of the way that they fail to separate the judger and the judged. For example, in the 
medical resident’s case, it would seem irrational for him to be confident that his determination of the 
correct dosage had not been distorted by fatigue, on the grounds that the data in his patient’s chart 
really do, after all, support prescribing that particular dosage. Or if my friend—whom I know to be 
more reliable than I am at weather prediction, and who has studied the data as carefully as I have—
disagrees with me about the chance of rain tomorrow, it would seem irrational for me to dismiss her 
disagreement on the grounds that, after all, the meteorological data support my prediction, so it 
must be she who misinterpreted the data this time. In each case, it seems irrational for the agent to 
assuage the worry about their own reliability in the way described, even if the medical or 
meteorological data do in fact support the opinion that the agent initially reached. 
 For this reason, various people have proposed that the agent must assess her reliability in a 
way that’s independent of the reasoning that the reliability evidence called into question.2 So-called 
independence requirements have been stated in various ways—many of them pretty vague. But the basic 
idea is something like this: When our medical resident assesses his reliability, in light of the 
information that he’s been awake for 27 hours, he should assess it in a way that’s independent of (at 
least) his reasoning from the data on his chart to the correctness of a particular dosage. Or when I 
assess the likely reliability of my weather forecast, in light of my friend’s disagreement, I should do 
so in a way that’s independent of my reasoning from the meteorological data to the correctness of a 
particular prediction. So while the agent must in the end serve as judge of her own reasoning, the 
sort of independence wanted is aimed as separating the agent’s judging of her reliability from the 
very thinking whose reliability is being judged.  
Independence requirements have mostly been discussed as underlying Conciliatory accounts 
of disagreement. But the motivation behind them—avoidance of a certain kind of question-
begging—is far more general. It applies equally in cases involving worries about sexist bias, political 
passion, hypoxia, and so on. In general, it seems plausible that some sort of independence 
requirement must be a part of any satisfactory account of the rational import of “higher-order 
evidence”: roughly, evidence that constrains our beliefs by way of bearing on the reliability of our 
thinking about the subject matters of our beliefs.3 
                                                 
2 Much of the discussion of so-called independence requirements has focused on the disagreement problem. And the 
requirements have sometimes been formulated in ways that won’t match what I’ll discuss here. In particular, 
disagreement discussions sometimes are stated in a way that focuses on reliability-assessments of the disagreeing friend, 
not of the agent. I think that the root issues are the same as the ones discussed here, since assessments of the reliability 
of a disagreeing friend are important in large part because they bear on the reliability of the agent’s own thinking on the 
given matter. I will not spend time here on delicate exegeses.  
 
3 I’ve tried to motivate Independence principles in Christensen (2010, 2011) 
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 Not surprisingly, this idea is problematic in several ways, and several writers have offered 
arguments against the very idea of independence principles. There are apparent counterexamples. 
And there are worries about whether we have sufficient motivation for precluding an agent from 
basing her judgment on evidence which she plainly has available to her—evidence which she may 
well be assessing impeccably. Here, I would like to examine some of these arguments, with an eye 
towards seeing how they may be resisted. This will, I think, give us some insight into how 
independence requirements should be understood. My hope is that this can take us some way 
toward meeting what I see as the biggest hurdle facing independence principles: the difficulty in 
giving a plausible formulation of such a principle with any decent degree of precision. I’ll sketch 
some of the difficulties facing this project at the end. 
 
1. Apparent Counterexamples 
 
Let us begin with a very rough formulation of the relevant sort of Independence principle. It is 
inadequate in various ways, but a simple formulation will be adequate to discuss objections.  
 
INDEPENDENCE: The rational response to higher-order evidence bearing on an agent’s first-
order thinking about P depends on an assessment of the reliability of her thinking about P—an 
assessment that’s independent of that thinking. 
 
 A common sort of purported counterexamples to Independence principles involves cases 
where an agent forms an initial belief based on extremely strong evidence, and begins with a very 
high rational credence in the claim at issue, and then receives some higher-order evidence suggesting 
that her thinking about that claim may be unreliable. The worry has mostly been discussed in the 
context of disagreement, so the examples involve the agent’s generally reliable friend disagreeing 
with such a claim. In many cases, it’s plausible that two things may both be true: (1) that before 
learning of her friend’s disagreement, the agent would rationally have thought her friend and herself 
equally likely to reach accurate opinions on matters of this type; and (2) that after hearing her 
friend’s opinion, the agent should not lose much confidence in her initial opinion. The worry, then, 
is that in virtue of (1), the agent must dismiss the threat to her reliability in a way that’s based on her 
reasoning to her initial opinion—which is exactly what independence principles are supposed to 
prevent. 
 For example, suppose my friend and I have worked very carefully through the same 
elementary addition problem. I’ve checked my answer, 17, in a couple of different ways with pencil 
and with a calculator. So I’m extremely confident in my answer. Then my friend, who has also been 
writing with a pencil and using a calculator, announces that she has arrived at 13! Even though I had 
no antecedent reason to think that my friend would be less reliable in this calculation, it seems that I 
should not lose a lot of confidence in my answer—instead, I should lose confidence in my friend’s 
reliability on this occasion. If asked why I lost confidence in my friend’s reliability on this occasion, I 
might well say, “She got 13, but the answer’s 17.” In other words, I seem to be assessing my friend’s 
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reliability—and thereby assuaging the potential worry about my own reliability—in a way that’s 
based on the very reasoning whose reliability I’m trying to assess.4  
 However, it has been argued that there is a way of understanding such cases that’s fully 
consistent with independence requirements. Independence requirements, properly understood, allow 
for the following sort of response in the our math case: “It’s incredibly unlikely that two agents who 
were feeling clear-headed, had no memories of recent drug-ingestion or psychotic episodes, and 
were genuinely working through a simple arithmetic problem using repeated pencil-and-paper and 
calculator checking, would end up with incompatible answers. So it’s overwhelmingly probable that 
one of us is feeling fuzzy-headed, has some other evidence of likely cognitive malfunction, hasn’t 
really been working carefully with the pencil and calculator, or (most realistically, perhaps) is being 
insincere for a joke or some other reason. Since I know that none of those apply to me, it’s likely 
that one of them applies to my friend. So the answer my friend announced is unlikely to be correct, 
and I needn’t take her disagreement as strong reason to doubt the reliability of my own reasoning.”5 
 This response depends on interpreting “independent of the agent’s thinking about P” in a 
particular way. The reliability assessment may take into account facts about the agent’s reasoning, as long 
as it doesn’t rely on that reasoning, in the sense of depending on that reasoning’s correctness. One 
can see the distinction at work here by noticing that one could well make the relevant assessment in 
advance of seeing the arithmetic problem at all—one should expect in advance that if one soberly 
and carefully goes through a simple problem, only to have one’s friend announce a disagreement, it 
is very likely that one’s original answer will be correct. And of course, in the above presentation of 
the example, our intuition that I should not lose confidence could not have depended on the 
correctness of my initial reasoning: I never said what my reasoning was, or what the arithmetic 
problem asked.  
This sort of response, which depends on clearly distinguishing between (a) assessing the 
reliability of some bit of one’s thinking by relying on that thinking, and (b) assessing the reliability of 
some bit of one’s thinking on the basis of facts about that thinking, will be crucial in examining 
some more recent purported counterexamples to Independence. For ease of reference, let us call 
this basic strategy the Facts About Reasoning (FAR) approach. With this in mind, let us turn to 
some more recent purported counterexamples to Independence principles. 
 
a. Tricky Question Disagreements 
 Michael Arsenault and Zachary C. Irving (2013) argue that Independence fails in cases 
involving the following sort of disagreement:  
 
Tricky Question: I’m thinking about the answer to a multiple-choice problem on a math 
test of the sort that I know sometimes utilizes “decoy answers”: wrong answers that seem 
right at first. As I think about problem 8, a problem involving dice, I first think that C is the 
right answer. Then I have an “aha!” moment, and decide that C was a decoy answer—it 
                                                 
4 For early versions of this type of objection, see Lackey (2010) or Sosa (2010).  
5 This is a highly condensed version of the account given in Christensen (2011,  9ff), which draws on Lackey(2010), 
though Lackey does not intend to be defending Independence principles. 
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requires double-counting the 2—and that answer A is really correct. My friend, who’s equally 
reliable at this sort of test, tells me she thinks that the answer is C.  
 
As Arsenault and Irving (A&I) point out, it does not seem that I should lose much confidence in my 
answer—I should conclude that my friend has fallen for the decoy. But in dismissing my friend’s 
disagreement, they argue, I use my first-order reasoning about the problem to conclude that 8 is a 
tricky question with decoy answer C. So I must violate Independence. 
 Now as A&I are aware, the FAR approach can also provide an Independence-respecting way 
of dismissing my friend’s answer. After all, I can rely on the fact that I seem to have recognized a decoy 
answer and avoided it, while my friend picked the answer that seemed to me to be the decoy. Surely, in 
cases fitting that general description, I’d expect that I’d be much more likely to be right. Indeed (as 
we can see from the above description of the case), I could even have said, in advance of seeing 
problem 8 at all, that if I find myself seeming to recognize a decoy that my friend chooses, I’m much 
more likely to be correct than my friend is. 
 Nevertheless, A&I argue that the Independence-violating response is more intuitive:  
 
We think our interpretation better captures how you’d intuitively dismiss your peer… When 
your peer announces that she got C, it would be perfectly natural to appeal to the first-order 
mathematical trick you think she’s fallen for. For example, you might think to yourself, ‘Aha! 
That sucker double-counted 2!’ You’d feel no pressure to retreat to the second-order fact 
that you seem to [have avoided a decoy answer]. (188) 
 
In support of the claim that the Independence-violating train of reasoning is legitimate, they point 
out that if I wanted to make sure my dismissal of my friend’s belief was correct, I’d naturally double-
check my own first-order mathematical reasoning, not double-check to see if it really did seem to me 
that I’d found a decoy answer. 
 In examining this argument, let us first consider the point about double-checking. The fact 
that I wouldn’t look for evidence about how things seemed to me is obviously explained by the 
improbability of being wrong about whether C really seemed to me to be a decoy. But the more 
interesting question is about the significance of going again through the first-order mathematical 
reasoning. Why, we might ask, would it be rational to be more confident in my answer after 
rechecking my reasoning (assuming I get the same result the second time)? Not necessarily because I 
have any new first-order mathematical reason to believe that C is a decoy—I may well have simply 
carefully retraced the very same steps I did the first time. However, in rechecking I do get new higher-
order evidence backing up the reliability of my original reasoning. (Again, one can see this by thinking 
about doing the reasoning in advance of actually doing it: if one reasons one’s way to an answer to a 
problem, and then rechecks one’s reasoning and gets the same answer, it’s more likely that one’s 
initial reasoning was correct.) So the FAR approach actually seems to explain quite naturally why I 
would double-check my first-order reasoning: having gone through the reasoning again, I’m 
rationally more confident in my answer. And the explanation does not involve becoming more 
certain that it really seemed to me that C was a decoy. 
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 It’s also worth noticing one reason that we should be careful in drawing conclusions from 
the naturalness of my explaining my friend’s disagreement by imputing a particular mathematical 
error to her. Suppose that I religiously observe Independence. In thinking out loud about what to 
believe about the math problem in light of my friend’s disagreement, I might reason follows: “I first 
got what seemed like the correct answer, C, then saw an apparent subtle problem with it—it seemed 
to involve double-counting 2—and concluded that A was right instead. My friend believes that C is 
the right answer. In situations when I reject an apparent decoy and my friend thinks that that same 
answer is correct, I’m usually right. So probably, I’m right this time. A is the correct answer, and C is 
a decoy—my friend, poor sucker, double-counted 2!”  
The point is that, having dismissed my friend’s disagreement via FAR, I am then in a 
position both to retain confidence in my original answer, and also to maintain confidence in the 
reasoning behind it—including that C is a decoy made plausible by double-counting 2. Nothing here 
violates Independence. Independence comes in at the stage of deciding how much to trust my own 
reasoning. If the verdict is good, I may then rely on that reasoning in various ways. This most 
obviously includes retaining my belief that A is the correct answer. But it also includes explaining my 
friend’s having fallen into error. 
A structural analogy may help make the point clearer. Suppose I have an excellent almanac, 
which tells me that the population of Barcelona is greater than 1.6 million. My friend Jocko has an 
almanac which says that the population of Barcelona is less than 1.6 million. If our almanacs are 
equally current, and produced by equally reputable publishers, I certainly cannot conclude that 
Jocko’s almanac is wrong in this case simply because it disagrees with mine.  But suppose I know 
that Jocko’s almanac was produced by the Acme Company, which pays high-school students to 
gather its information by asking random Reddit threads. In that case, I should not lose confidence in 
what my almanac tells me. And, in that case, it would be perfectly natural for me to say to Jocko, 
“Your almanac is wrong about the population of Barcelona. I know from my almanac that it’s over 
1.6 million”. Once I dismiss the disagreement provided by Jocko’s almanac on grounds that are 
independent of what my almanac says about Barcelona, I can both believe what my almanac says, 
and use that to support the claim that Jocko’s almanac is wrong about the population of Barcelona 
in particular. 
 Coming back to the case of peer disagreement, it’s worth noticing that we do not always 
distinguish clearly between (1) explaining why I can disregard my friend’s belief, and (2) explaining 
why she reached the wrong belief. Independence precludes me from relying on my initial reasoning 
for the first of these explanatory tasks, but once that is done, Independence poses no obstacle to my 
relying on my initial reasoning for the second. So in situations where I do legitimately dismiss my 
friend’s disagreement, the intuitive legitimacy of my attributing a particular error to my friend does 
not, I think, give much support to the claim that Independence-violating reasoning is legitimate. 
 Is there a way, then, of getting a firmer intuitive grip on the issue? At this point, we have 
identified two lines of reasoning in support of dismissing my friend’s disagreement: one which 
violates Independence by relying on the relevant first-order reasoning, and one which respects 
Independence by focusing on facts about the reasoning (in this case, my seeming to discover the 
decoy answer). A natural way to think about the legitimacy of these lines of reasoning is to think 
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about cases where these two sorts of factors come apart. So, for example, we might leave the first-
order reasoning in A&I’s case unchanged, but change the higher-order evidence in a way that affects 
the legitimacy of using the seeming decoy-discovery to dismiss my friend’s opinion. For example, 
consider: 
 
Extra-Tricky Question: I’m thinking about the answer to a multiple-choice problem on a 
test of the sort that I know sometimes utilizes decoy answers. In fact, I know that it not 
only uses questions that have ordinary decoy answers, it also uses an equal number of 
questions that involve “double-decoy answers”: these are answers which are likely to seem 
like decoy answers, even though they’re correct! (The tempting-but-unsound reasoning in 
these problems leads to the conclusion that a certain answer is a decoy.) I’ve done tests like 
this with my friend many times. When I think I’ve avoided a certain (regular) decoy answer, 
and my friend announces belief in that same answer, my friend has been right as often as I 
have. 
 Today, as I think about problem 8, a problem involving dice, I first think that C is 
the right answer. Then I have an “aha!” moment, and decide that C was a decoy answer—it 
requires double-counting the 2—and that A is really correct. Then my friend tells me she 
thinks that the answer is C. 
 
In this case, given my track record in similar disagreements with my friend, it seems clear that I may 
not dismiss my friend’s opinion. But notice that the Independence-violating reasoning A&I offer me 
in the original Tricky Question case is just as applicable here. So if it were legitimate there, it’s hard 
to see why I could not similarly dismiss my friend’s disagreement in the second case. By contrast, the 
Independence-respecting train of reasoning that allowed me to dismiss my friend’s disagreement in 
the first case does not apply in the second case. In Extra-Tricky Question, my seeming discovery of 
a decoy does not have the same higher-order implications for my likely correctness as it did in the 
original case.  
This strongly indicates that it is only the Independence-respecting train of reasoning that 
makes dismissing my friend legitimate in the original case. So it seems to me that we need not rely 
on questionable intuitions about which of the two trains of reasoning in the original case are 
legitimate. We can test for legitimacy using other cases. And when we do, it seems to me that the 
Independence-violating train of reasoning fails the test. 
 
b. Asymmetrical Evidence Disagreements 
 
In a sustained critique of Independence principles, Thomas Kelly (2013) offers a different sort of 
counterexample: 
 
Holocaust Denier: I believe, on the basis of solid historical evidence (E), that the holocaust 
occurred (H). I meet Denier, who informs me that he disagrees. But I know that he’s 




As Kelly points out, I should not lose confidence in my belief in this case. And Kelly then claims 
that in dismissing the Denier’s belief, I may legitimately reason in the following way: “E, and E 
strongly supports H. But Denier is ignorant of E. So Denier is ignorant of evidence that strongly 
supports H. Therefore, Denier’s opinion about H is untrustworthy.” And this reasoning would 
violate Independence.6 
 Now Kelly is well aware of the FAR strategy, and acknowledges that it would work in some 
asymmetrical-evidence cases. So, for instance, suppose that I have a strong apparent memory of 
having eggs for breakfast, and my friend—who was not with me this morning—has a much lower 
degree of confidence in my having had eggs than I do. Clearly, I should not conciliate. But as Kelly 
notes, this case does not put pressure on Independence, since I can dismiss my friend’s low 
credence without appealing to the evidence on which my belief is based. I’d reason as follows: “I 
have vivid memories about what I had for breakfast. My friend, not having been there, has no such 
memories. So his opinion is lacking in epistemic credentials.” The key here is that I’m not assuming, 
in the course of dismissing my friend’s belief, that my evidence really does support strong 
confidence in my having had eggs. I’m just relying on my having some vivid apparent memories about what 
I ate, which would be expected to reliably indicate what I really did eat. 
 The obvious question, then, is whether a similar approach can be taken to the Holocaust-
Denier case. Kelly thinks not. He argues that my dismissal of Denier’s opinion rests crucially on my 
assessment of E as strongly supporting H. He acknowledges that in certain versions of the case, an 
Independence-respecting way of dismissing Denier will be available: For example, if E came from 
my visiting the Holocaust Museum, and I know that Denier has not been exposed to any similarly 
reliable source of information about H, I’d have an Independence-respecting way of dismissing his 
disagreement. But Kelly claims that in his original case, there is no way for me to dismiss Denier’s 
belief that doesn’t rest on my claim that E strongly supports H. 
 But why should we think this? Kelly presents his case in schematic form, without describing 
the sort of evidence that I have and Denier lacks. In the one detailed description we have of a case 
where E can be identified—the Holocaust Museum case—it’s easy to see how the exact sort of 
Independence-respecting reasoning we used in the eggs case can be employed to discredit Denier. If 
we changed the source of evidence from museum-visits to college courses, or independent historical 
study, or exposure to experts, it does not seem that the move would become any harder to make. So 
without seeing a concrete filling-out of the Holocaust-Denier case that would somehow preclude a 
similar move, I don’t see why Holocaust Denier would pose a real difficulty for Independence.7,8 
                                                 
6 I’ve condensed Kelly’s presentation of the case, and the dismissal argument, for simplicity. The precise version of 
Independence he’s targeting requires that my assessment of Denier’s belief in this case be independent of  my 
“assessment of the considerations that led [me] to believe” that H. Applied to the reasoning in the text, this would target 
the step “E strongly confirms H”. I should also note that the particular Independence principles Kelly considers are 
particularly formulated to apply to disagreement, rather than to higher-order evidence in general. This won’t matter right 
away, but will be important below. 
 




 Now I should point out that while Kelly believes that Holocaust Denier is a counterexample 
to Independence, he does not want to rest the main weight of his critique on such examples.9 But 
Errol Lord—in a piece entitled “From Independence to Conciliationism: an Obituary” (2014)—
attempts to push Kelly’s style of counterexample harder. Instead of arguing that Independence-
respecting trains of reasoning for dismissing disagreement will be unavailable in some asymmetrical-
evidence cases, Lord, like Arsenault and Irving, claims that even if such lines are available, the 
Independence-violating trains of reasoning are legitimate. He writes, “If you can permissibly cite the 
fact that you have more evidence, you can permissibly cite that evidence. Since you can permissibly 
cite the fact that you have more evidence, you can cite the evidence. Thus, Independence is false.” 
(370).  
However, as we saw above, we should be careful in how we treat intuitions about what one 
may reasonably say in failing to conciliate with dissenters’ opinions. Once one has dismissed the 
dissenter’s opinion, one will be in a position to cite one’s original evidence and reasoning, both to 
support one’s belief and to explain why the dissenter is mistaken. So we cannot refute Independence 
by cherry-picking cases where dismissing disagreement is legitimate on Independent grounds, and 
pointing out that it’s natural to support the retained belief by citing one’s original first-order 
reasoning. Again, we can test the legitimacy claim more carefully: by considering cases where 
Independence would not allow dismissing dissent. 
 There are many such cases. The Extra-Tricky Question case was one designed to parallel 
A&I’s example. But we can more closely parallel the Holocaust Denier case by considering a 
disagreement over a matter where we do not have entailing evidence. In order to make it a case 
where Independence-respecting dismissal will not be appropriate, we need only equalize the 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 As Alex Grossman pointed out to me, it’s not clear that the anti-question-begging motivation for Independence would 
really support the requirement that I bracket the evidential support E gives to H in this case. Let us suppose that Denier 
is completely ignorant of E. Then one might think that his disagreement does not cast significant doubt on my original 
assessment of E’s bearing on H. 
 There are some tricky issues here, but let us suppose that this is correct. In that case, one might argue that this 
sort of case should not be even a prima facie counterexample to Independence, if Independence is properly formulated. 
This line might suggest that a correct formulation of Independence should allow in certain cases that some of the 
reasoning behind my original belief—the reasoning purely from non-shared evidence— could after all be used in 
evaluating the reliability of my peer. 
 I’m not sure what to make of this line. One complication is this. It seems that evaluating the reliability of those 
who disagree is important at least in part because that bears on my own reliability. But the anti-question-begging 
motivation for Independence really does support not allowing me to evaluate the reliability of my own first-order 
reasoning about H in a way that depends on that very reasoning. So it might be argued that Independence, properly 
formulated, would after all prohibit my relying on my reasoning from E to H in assessing my own reliability after 
meeting Denier (or before, for that matter). If we take that line, then then a properly formulated Independence principle 
would after all prohibit me from relying on my reasoning from E to H in assessing my own reliability. In that case, 
Kelly’s case would be a counterexample to Independence —if there was no way of dismissing Denier that did not rely 
on my reasoning from E to H. So the fact that there does seem to be a way of dismissing Denier’s opinion in a way that 
doesn’t rely on that reasoning  would be crucial to preserving Independence after all. 
 




evidence possessed by the two parties. So consider an example of the sort often used to motivate 
conciliatory accounts of disagreement:10 
 
Rain Denier: I believe, on the basis of solid, but complex, meteorological evidence E, that it 
will rain tomorrow (R). I discover that my colleague Wendy, who also has E as her 
meteorological evidence, believes ~R. Wendy and I have long track-records in this sort of 
prediction. Neither of them is perfect, but Wendy’s is just as good as mine. In cases where 
we’ve disagreed in the past, she’s been right as often as I have. 
 
 In this case, it would not be rational for me to simply dismiss Wendy’s disagreement—even 
if, as we may suppose, this happens to be one of the cases where I’m the one who assessed the 
meteorological evidence correctly.11 But of course, there is an Independence-violating train of 
reasoning that would justify dismissing Wendy’s disagreement, if it were legitimate: E really does 
support R, after all. The difference between Holocaust Denier and Rain Denier lies just in the 
higher-order consideration that in the former, I have more probative first-order evidence than 
Denier does, while in the latter Wendy and I share the same first-order evidence. Of course, in Rain 
Denier, I can cite the fact that we have the same evidence E. But as we can see, this does not 
translate into the permissibility of my dismissing Wendy’s disagreement by directly citing E to 
support R. There is an important distinction between citing the fact that I have certain evidence, and 
directly citing that evidence in support of dismissing my friend’s dissent. Erasing that distinction 
would leave us without any explanation for why my dismissing Wendy’s disagreement would be 
illegitimate. 
 This point generalizes. Lord seeks to defend the legitimacy of Independence-violating 
reasoning in cases where Independence-respecting reasoning is also available. He complains that 
invoking Independence-respecting reasoning to defuse purported counterexamples like Holocaust 
Denier goes wrong by treating the purported counterexamples as ‘extensional’: that is, as cases 
where Independence is inconsistent with the correct verdict. But as we’ve seen, if the sort of 
reasoning he would defend were legitimate, it would be legitimate even in cases where 
Independence-respecting reasoning is not available. The literature on Conciliatory approaches to 
disagreement provides plenty of examples: Some involve disagreements with peers (e.g. 
disagreements about restaurant bills between equally-reliable mental calculators, or disagreements 
about rain between equally reliable forecasters). Perhaps more pointedly in the present context, there 
are also disagreements with epistemic superiors (e.g. when a logician tells me my proof is wrong, or 
when a superior meteorologist tells me it’s not going to rain). And the literature on other higher-
order reasons for self-doubt offers still more cases (e.g. medical diagnoses made in conditions of 
                                                 
10 I’ve changed the topic of disagreement to avoid contamination of our intuitive judgments by, e.g., background 
assumptions about the irrationality or immoral motivations behind actual cases of Holocaust denial. 
 
11 One could always simply reject this judgment. But a main motivation for invoking Independence principles is precisely 
to explain intuitively compelling conciliatory verdicts in this sort of case. Simply denying those intuitive verdicts would 
of course leave Independence unmotivated. But I take it that Lord (like Kelly and A&I) is after a more interesting way of 




sleep-deprivation, conclusions about airplane fuel levels made when likely hypoxic). In many such 
cases—the ones that motivate invoking Independence principles in the first place—it seems 
illegitimate to dismiss worries about one’s own thinking by relying on the targeted reasoning. But 
why? If it’s not intuitively legitimate to use Independence-violating reasoning to dismiss doubts in 
these cases, and if the cases where dismissal is legitimate are exactly those cases where 
Independence-respecting reasons for dismissal are available, surely this suggests that it’s only the 
Independence-respecting reasoning that’s legitimate, even when both are available. To put the point 
another way: if Independence is false, it should be quite easy to find ‘extensional’ counterexamples 
to it.12 
 
2. Worries about Motivation 
 
Even if the apparent counterexamples to Independence principles do not in the end succeed, it is 
undeniable that the principles are awkward. So if a less awkward way could be found of explaining 
why dismissal is legitimate in some cases and not in others, Independence might well turn out to be 
unmotivated. Here, I’ll look at two arguments along these lines, and a third argument intended to 
show that the motivation for Independence principles only supports weak versions of the 
principle—versions which cannot support full-blown Conciliationism about disagreement. 
 
a. Independence and explaining friends’ errors 
 
  Arsenault and Irving, having rejected Independence, do offer a way of distinguishing 
between cases where Independence-violating dismissal is legitimate, and ones where it is not.13 They 
contrast their Tricky Question case with a more standard case where I disagree with my peer about a 
non-tricky math question, and acknowledge that in that case, relying on my own reasoning to 
dismiss my friend’s dissent would illegitimately beg the question. So consider: 
 
Ordinary Math Test: My friend and I are taking an ordinary math test, without tricky 
questions. We have long and equally-good track records on this type of test, and when we’ve 
disagreed, we’ve been right equally often. I think (correctly) that that the answer to question 
8 is ‘true’, but my friend thinks it’s ‘false’. 
 
Why would it be illegitimate to use Independence-violating reasoning in this sort of case, but not in 
Tricky Question? A&I propose that the difference is that in the Tricky Question case, my use of my 
first-order reasoning is incorporated into an explanation of why my friend made a mistake. 
 It’s not clear to me that this criterion really will give the right answer in the general run of 
non-tricky-question disagreement cases. In the Ordinary Math Test example, my first-order 
reasoning would support the hypothesis that my friend made some calculational error or other, but 
                                                 
12 Thus it seems to me that—to adapt a line from Mark Twain—Lord’s report of the death of Independence-based 
Conciliationism is something of an exaggeration (See White (1897)). 
 
13 The account they offer is only designed to apply to disagreement cases—I won’t worry about this here. 
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would not point to a specific error. Perhaps the idea is that that’s not specific enough an 
explanation. But we might consider a math test comprised of problems for which one particular 
kind of error is particularly common. Suppose the error is failing to carry the “1”, but the problems 
are complicated enough (with the results of some calculations being subtracted from the results of 
others) that when two people’s answers differ by 10 or 100, we don’t have reason to think that the 
higher answer is more likely to be correct—just that someone forgot to carry a “1” somewhere. So 
suppose that my friend and I have long track-records of equally high reliability on this sort of 
problem, and that on the occasions that we have disagreed, we’ve been right equally often. If I reach 
a certain answer, and my friend announces that her answer differs from mine by 10, it seems clear 
that I cannot dismiss her disagreement. But of course here I would have a quite specific explanation 
of her error—that she forgot to carry a “1”.  
 One might object that this is still a more general explanation than I had in the Tricky 
Question case, where I’d identified a specific place at which my friend made the error. But we can 
make our new case parallel in that way, too. Suppose I see some train of reasoning involving a 
particular carrying omission that would yield my friend’s answer. But—to make the higher-order 
evidence parallel—suppose that she tells me she sees a train of reasoning involving a carrying 
omission that would produce my answer. (And we can suppose that we have a long history of being 
right equally often in this type of disagreement.) Again, it would be illegitimate for me to dismiss her 
via my original reasoning. But this time, my original reasoning would support a very specific 
explanation of her error. 
 In fact, the Extra-Tricky Question example reinforces this point. There, my original 
reasoning points to a particular error on my friend’s part—double-counting the 2. In fact, it’s the 
exact same explanation A&I invoke in their account of why the Independence-violating reasoning is 
legitimate in their original Tricky Question case. But again, once we take care to control the thought-
experiment by balancing the higher-order evidence, Independence-violating dismissals of my friend’s 
disagreement no longer seem legitimate. And this is unrelated to whether those dismissals involve a 
more or less specific explanation for my friend’s error.14 
 
b. Does the Requirement of Total Evidence make Independence Otiose? 
 
Kelly, also concentrating on disagreement cases, agrees with the Conciliationist that some loss of 
confidence is often required, even when the agent in question began by reasoning correctly. He 
notes that in some such cases—e.g. when an expert disagrees with my belief that P—the 
Conciliationist is correct about one thing: it would be unreasonably dogmatic to dismiss the expert’s 
disagreement by a train of reasoning such as: “Well P is true, and you believe ~P, so despite your 
general reliability, you’re wrong this time, and I needn’t worry about your disagreement.” 
Nevertheless, Kelly argues, we don’t need to invoke anything like Independence to explain this 
                                                 
14 It’s also worth noting that Independence-violating reasoning that involves a particular explanation of one’s friend’s 
error is equally available in cases where the friend is an epistemic superior—yet dismissing the friend’s opinion is such 
cases is intuitively irrational. 
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phenomenon. He offers what he takes to be a better explanation: that in such cases, my total evidence 
no longer supports my belief that P; so it no longer supports my dismissing the expert by citing P. 
 
[H]ere is the short story about why it will often be unreasonable and dogmatic for me to 
dismiss your contrary opinion in the envisaged way: after I add the fact that you believe as 
you do to my stock of evidence, it will no longer be reasonable for me to believe that p, 
given what is then my total evidence. And if it’s no longer reasonable for me to believe that 
p, then I lack any rational basis for inferring that your sincere testimony is misleading 
evidence. (45) 
 
As Kelly notes, the Conciliationist will say exactly the same thing. In cases similar to Ordinary Math 
Test, the Conciliationist will say that my total evidence—including the disagreement of a logic 
expert, or even the disagreement of a peer—no longer supports my belief that answer C is correct. 
But the Conciliationist will argue that we cannot explain this without appeal to a principle along the 
lines of Independence. And this is where Kelly dissents. 
 
Someone who rejects such principles can still account for the badness of intuitively dogmatic 
reasoning simply by appealing directly to the normative requirement that one take into 
account one’s total evidence (as opposed to some proper subset of one’s total evidence). In 
short, the Principle of Total Evidence can do all of the work that needs doing. (46) 
 
Of course, this raises the question of why it is—if we reject Independence principles—that 
the total evidence doesn’t support P after I learn of my friend’s disagreement. As Kelly realizes, the 
apparent need for something like Independence is sharpest in cases (like disagreements over math 
test answers) where my original belief was based on my seeing how the evidence entails the 
correctness of my answer. After all, what bearing could sociological facts about people’s opinions 
have on the purely mathematical question of whether certain premises entail the correctness of a 
certain answer? Since my total evidence still entails the correctness of my original belief, it’s hard to 
see why a peer’s (or even an expert’s) testimony should have any weight at all. Kelly writes: 
 
[T]here is a genuine puzzle here, but it is a mistake to think that that puzzle motivates 
the adoption of Independence or Independence* [these are Kelly’s formulations of 
disagreement-specific Independence principles]. After all, … whenever one performs a non-
trivial calculation, one should not be perfectly confident of one’s answer even before another 
person comes on the scene (given one’s awareness that one is fallible, etc.) But once it is 
granted that one should not be perfectly confident even before one’s view is contradicted by 
a peer, there is no additional mystery or formal difficulty as to how acquiring that misleading 
testimonial evidence can push the credence that it is reasonable for one to have still lower. 
… There is presumably some story to be told here. The crucial point is that there is no 
reason to think that the story in question entails Independence or Independence*, since 
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those principles explicitly concern how one should assess the beliefs of other people, and the 
phenomenon arises even before other people come on the scene. (46-47) 
 
 Kelly is certainly correct in pointing out that no disagreement-specific Independence principle 
can account for the general phenomenon in question. But disagreement is best seen as just one 
among many sources of doubt about the reliability of one’s thinking. (Our question about total 
evidence comes up equally in other cases: what bearing does my tiredness, or facts about oxygen 
levels in my blood, have on the question of whether a certain conclusion is true, given premises that 
entail that conclusion?) So it’s only natural to expect that whatever explains why disagreement 
evidence can require loss of confidence in propositions entailed by one’s evidence will also explain 
why evidence that one is drugged, tired, biased—or even one’s awareness that one is fallible—can 
do the same thing. And if something along the lines of Independence can provide the requisite 
general explanation, then the right way of applying the Principle of Total Evidence will actually 
require using an Independence principle.  
 Some support for this approach can be seen by contrasting two Entailment cases: 
 
Entailment vs First-Order Inductive Evidence: I’m doing a multiple-choice math test, in 
which I know that the right answers were assigned randomly to letters A through E. So 
without looking at what problem 8 says, I have statistical evidence which makes rational low 
(.2) credence in answer C, which is “15.” Then I look at the problem: “2.5 x (9 - 3) = x”. I 
rationally become extremely confident that C, “15,” is correct.  
 
Entailment vs Higher-Order Inductive Evidence: I’m doing a fill-in-the-blank math test. 
Problem 8 is “2.5 x (9 - 3) = ___”. I become extremely confident that the correct answer is 
15. Then I learn that before doing the problem, I’d been given a drug which causes people to 
get wrong answers to this sort of problem 4/5 of the time, while seeming to themselves to 
be doing math clear-headedly. (I’ve been given the drug before, and have arrived at correct 
answers only 20% of the time.) My rational credence that “15” is the right answer drops 
dramatically, to around .2. 
 
In both cases, I have some problem-given evidence, and I also have some inductive 
evidence. In the first case, the inductive evidence is that answer C is correct in only 20% of the 
problems; other things equal, it would support .2 credence that the answer is “15”. In the second 
case, the inductive evidence is that an agent who’d been drugged in a way that results in getting 
correct answers 20% of the time got the answer “15”; other things equal, this also would support .2 
credence in “15”. But in each case, my total evidence also includes the problem-given evidence that 
entails that the correct answer is “15”. 
In the case involving ordinary inductive evidence, the entailing evidence acts just as we might 
expect it to: it swamps the inductive evidence, rendering it virtually irrelevant. But in the case 
involving significant higher-order reason for self-doubt, the entailing evidence cannot stand up to 
the inductive evidence that I’m likely to be reasoning badly. What explains the difference? Of 
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course, there are many complexities that arise in cases where different bits of evidence push in 
different directions, even when only first-order evidence is involved. But it seems to me that a very 
natural explanation for the dramatic difference between these two cases in particular lies in some 
aspect of rationality that, in some way, at least partially disables the entailing evidence in the second 
case, allowing the inductive evidence to gain some purchase. Independence principles—which 
disallow full reliance on otherwise-compelling reasoning when an agent has higher-order reason for 
self-doubt—seem a very natural way to explain this puzzling phenomenon. 
 So it seems to me that Kelly’s observation does not in the end reveal any lack of motivation 
for Independence principles. But it does underscore an important point: that the motivation for 
such principles is not confined to disagreement cases. The correct understanding of rational 
responses to one’s total evidence in disagreement cases should flow out of our more general 
understanding of how the Principle of Total Evidence applies in cases where some of one’s evidence 
is higher-order. And this general understanding should include an explanation of how entailing 
evidence, while it typically swamps other evidence, is easily undermined by certain sorts of higher-
order evidence. If an Independence principle can provide the requisite explanation, then we have 
reason to see Independence not as being a competitor to the Principle of Total Evidence, but 
instead, as being exactly what allows us to apply the Principle of Total Evidence correctly, in judging 
our own epistemic performance. 
 One final point is worth making about the relationship between Independence principles 
and the Principle of Total Evidence. One might worry that Independence principles are somehow 
incompatible with the basic idea behind the Requirement of Total Evidence: after all, don’t they 
require an agent’s response to her total evidence be independent of the support provided by (at least 
part of) her evidence? And doesn’t render a portion of her evidence irrelevant? 
 To answer this question, it’s important to note that Independence principles apply directly to 
just one component of an agent’s rational response to her evidence: her assessment of her own 
reliability. And that assessment may combine with various other factors—factors which are also 
shaped by the agent’s total evidence—to determine the credence that’s rational for the agent to end 
up with. (We saw one aspect of this in thinking about cases where an agent brackets some reasoning 
in judging her friend unreliable, and then, having dismissed the friend’s disagreement, rationally 
relies on that same reasoning in retaining her belief, and in explaining where her friend went wrong.) 
So there is no reason to think that accounts of rational belief that incorporate Independence 
principles must have the consequence that some portion of an agent’s total evidence is epistemically 
irrelevant. True, some Independence-based accounts of higher-order evidence would have this 
consequence. But others, just as clearly, do not. For example, on some Independence-based 
accounts, the fact that my problem-given evidence really entailed that the correct answer in the 
second Entailment case above was 15 would be crucial in determining what credence it was rational 
for me to have in that case.15 So Independence principles need not conflict with the Requirement of 
Total Evidence in any way—in fact, they may help constitute it. 
                                                 
15  For examples of both sorts of accounts, and detailed discussion of this issue, see Sliwa and Horowitz (2015), 





c. Can only a Weak Form of Independence be Motivated? 
 
Han van Wietmarschen (2013) does not argue for rejecting all versions of Independence principles. 
Instead, he argues that attention to the motivation behind imposing such principles will show that 
the strong versions needed to underwrite robustly conciliatory views of disagreement are false. The 
weaker principles (which he thinks can be properly motivated) allow that agents who hold onto their 
original beliefs in certain disagreement situations remain justified to believe their original beliefs, 
despite the disagreement.  
Van Wietmarschen begins by pointing out that the loose formulations of Independence 
found in the literature admit of two sorts of interpretation when they require, for example, that 
when I’m in a disagreement situation, I evaluate the epistemic credentials of the person who 
disagrees with me “in a way that doesn’t rely on the reasoning behind my initial belief”.16 Focusing 
on cases where an agent initially forms a belief that P on the basis of first-order evidence E, an 
“Unrestricted” Independence principle would require the agent to bracket all reasoning from E to P 
in assessing her own and her friend’s reliability. A “Restricted” principle would only require the 
agent to bracket her own original actual process of reasoning. 
 His argument focuses on disagreement situations where two epistemic peers do some fairly 
quick reasoning, then discover that they disagree—situations like Ordinary Math Test, where I 
believe that the answer to question 8 is ‘true’, then discover that my equally-reliable friend believes 
it’s ‘false’. Van Wietmarschen argues that in this sort of situation, Unrestricted versions of 
Independence are unmotivated, and we should only require the agent’s assessment to be 
independent of the actual episode of reasoning she used in coming to her initial view. This is 
because my friend’s disagreement does not impugn my general ability to reason to correct answers 
on math tests—it only provides evidence that I made an error in my particular original reasoning 
process on this occasion. So while it would beg the question to rely on that particular process—
hence motivating the imposition of a Restricted form of Independence—the same kind of 
motivation is not available to support imposing Unrestricted Independence. 
Given this claim, van Wietmarschen argues that agents in disagreements such as Ordinary 
Math Test do not lose justification to believe their initial views (assuming that those views were 
justified to begin with), despite the disagreement. That’s because such an agent’s first-order evidence 
supports the claim that she was right this time, and this support is not disabled by Restricted 
Independence, which only applies to a specific past episode of reasoning. So if we understand 
Independence correctly, an Independent assessment would not, after all, cast doubt on the claim 
that the agent’s original belief was correct, and the friend was mistaken this time.17 
                                                 
16 The ambiguous formulation is from Christensen (2011). 
 
17 Van Wietmarschen also offers a more detailed positive argument that on plausible theories of evidential support, 
Restricted Independence allows agents in cases like Ordinary Math Test to be justified to believe the proposition they 
originally believed (supposing, still, that those beliefs were justified before the disagreement). He illustrates his argument 
with the following theory of evidential support, which he credits to Richard Foley: 
(ES): A body of evidence E supports the belief that p for subject S if and only if S would believe p on ideal 
reflection on whether p, given access to E. 
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 Van Wietmarschen goes on to argue that in cases like Ordinary Math Test, even if the 
steadfast agent is still justified to believe P, she is no longer justified in believing P—her belief in P is no 
longer well-grounded. That’s because the higher-order evidence does target the episode of reasoning 
that the agent used in coming to believe P. Restricted Independence applies, so to be properly 
grounded, the agent’s belief would have to be based on, or grounded in, reasoning independent of 
that targeted reasoning episode. We might put this in terms of propositional and doxastic rationality 
by saying that, on van Wietmarschen’s account, P is still propositionally rational for the agent to believe, 
but the agent no longer has a doxastically rational belief in P. And van Wietmarschen rightly points out 
that much of the disagreement literature does not distinguish between the two notions. On this 
view, our intuitive rejection of the rationality of steadfast responses to cases like Ordinary Math Test 
should be seen merely as responding to a lack of well-groundedness, or doxastic rationality.18 
 One important thing to notice about this position is that the proposed narrowing of 
conciliatory views should not provide much comfort to those disturbed by the views’ skeptical 
implications. True, it would have the consequence that those who had reasoned correctly prior to 
learning of disagreement, and then stood by their beliefs, still believed the propositions that were 
supported by their evidence. But their beliefs would not be held rationally, any more than would be 
the beliefs of those who form beliefs through wishful thinking, and just happen to arrive at the 
beliefs their evidence supports. In maintaining our controversial beliefs, we would still be believing 
irrationally. Indeed, van Wietmarschen holds that agents in such situations are required to suspend 
judgment on the disputed topic. 
Nevertheless, the argument does pose an interesting question for defenders of 
Independence. Is it true that the motivation for Independence principles only supports requiring 
independence from a particular episode of reasoning? 
 To examine this more general question, we might look at examples beyond the sort of 
disagreements van Wietmarschen concentrates on. We can start with a case that doesn’t involve 
disagreement at all. Consider the small-plane pilot who has good evidence from her altimeter that 
she’s likely to be hypoxic. Even before she reads the dials and gauges that provide the data relevant 
to calculating whether she has enough fuel to reach the more-distant airport—that is, before she 
forms any judgment about whether she has enough fuel—she has reason to distrust whatever 
calculations she might perform from this data. In this case, what’s targeted by her higher-order 
                                                                                                                                                             
Van Wietmarschen’s idea is that ideal reflection is deep and thorough, so in the disagreement situation, an agent who 
had reflected ideally would realize that while she had reflected deeply and thoroughly, her friend who disagreed about 
the logic answer had only thought about it briefly during the test.  
However, as Chad Marxen points out, this argument is problematic. If we imagine such an agent reasoning that 
way, we’re imagining her to have evidence about her reasoning process that is absent in the original case. So even if such 
an agent would arrive at a rational belief that P, she would not do so on the basis of the original evidence E. And the 
argument is supposed to show that P is rational to believe on E, not on a batch of total evidence that differs with respect 
to crucially relevant claims about the two agents’ reasoning. I will not go more deeply into this problem here; see Marxen 
(ms.) for details. 
 
18 I will not discuss van Wietmarschen’s treatment of well-groundedness, but will note that a somewhat similar position 
is defended in Smithies (2015). For some reasons to worry about holding that disagreement destroys well-groundedness 




evidence is not some specific episode of reasoning that took place in the past. The pilot’s higher-
order evidence targets any reasoning the pilot might do from the dials and gauges to the conclusion 
that she has enough fuel. 
 Given that the pilot’s higher-order evidence targets any such reasoning she might do, a 
properly formulated Independence principle will have to cover any such reasoning. So the 
motivations for imposing an Independence requirement in this sort of case will support something 
stronger than Restricted Independence—in fact, something more along the lines of Unrestricted 
Independence would seem to be exactly what’s motivated. And it seems clear that the same will 
apply in many other cases of higher-order evidence—for example, ones involving bias, drugs, or 
fatigue. It should even apply in many cases of disagreement—especially cases of persistent 
disagreement on controversial issues that give the issue much of its interest. After all, in these cases 
one often knows about the disagreement before one studies the issue.19 In many such cases, the 
reasoning targeted by the higher-order evidence would include any first-order reasoning the agent 
might do on the relevant topic. If that’s right, then in many cases, something along the lines of 
Unrestricted Independence seems to be appropriate. 
 With this in mind, we might now ask: What does this show about the suggestion that higher-
order evidence in these cases is relevant only to the well-foundedness (or doxastic 
justification/rationality) of an agent’s beliefs, and not relevant to what the agent has justification to 
believe (that is, to propositional justification/rationality)? Of course, the answer to this sort of 
question will depend on how we understand the relevant notions, and different writers have offered 
interestingly different accounts. But without taking a stand on the ‘right’ way of understanding them, 
it’s worth noting a sharp difference between standard cases where agents form beliefs that are 
propositionally, but not doxastically, rational, and cases where an agent ignores higher-order 
evidence and ends up believing the proposition that would be supported by her first-order evidence 
alone.  
 Suppose that Jocko has strong evidence supporting the belief that Xena is guilty. But instead 
of thinking through the evidence, Jocko just jumps to the conclusion that she’s guilty, because he 
dislikes her and wants her to be guilty. In such cases, the fact that Jocko’s evidence makes it rational 
to believe that Xena is guilty—that it makes “Xena is guilty” propositionally rational for Jocko to 
believe—seems closely tied to the fact that, were Jocko to form a belief about this matter in the 
most rational way, given his evidence, he’d believe Xena to be guilty.  
 Now there may be difficulties with general principles that define propositional justification in 
this way. For example, in some strange cases, the agent’s forming a belief about the relevant matter 
would itself provide the agent with evidence against the believed proposition.20 But putting this sort 
of complication aside, it’s quite plausible that something like this relationship is behind our idea of 
propositional rationality: in general, the propositions that are rational for an agent to believe, given 
                                                 
19 I should note that van Wietmarschen himself thinks that deep, persistent disagreements can undermine propositional 
justification. 
 




certain evidence, are those that would be believed as part of an ideally rational doxastic response to 
that evidence. 
 But notice that nothing like this is true in cases where agents disregard higher-order 
evidence. As we’ve just seen, higher-order evidence does not always target a particular past episode 
of reasoning; in many cases, it targets whatever first-order reasoning the agent might do on the 
relevant matter. Let us consider an agent in such a situation—for example, our pilot. Suppose that 
despite the strong evidence that she’s hypoxic, she decides not to worry about that. Instead, she just 
consults the relevant dials and gauges, and forms the belief on that basis that she has enough fuel. 
Since the reasoning on which her belief is based is targeted by her higher-order evidence, her belief 
will not, on the suggested view, be doxastically rational. But if that’s right, then it seems that she 
cannot reason her way to a doxastically rational belief that she has enough fuel, even if she manages 
to do her first-order reasoning impeccably. And it’s not just that she lacks some epistemic skill: no 
one with her total evidence—which includes the higher-order evidence of hypoxia—could rationally 
believe that they had enough fuel. And it’s worth noting that the barrier to our pilot’s forming a 
doxastically rational belief that she has enough fuel has nothing to do with her forming such a belief 
providing evidence against the relevant proposition. It’s her higher-order evidence, which is part of 
her original total evidence, which precludes doxastically rational belief that she has enough fuel. 
 To my mind, that constitutes a good reason to treat cases of ignoring higher-order evidence 
quite differently from standard cases in which an agent believes a proposition that is rational for her 
to believe, but where her belief is not doxastically justified/rational or well-founded. Indeed, it 
seems quite unintuitive to me to say that while our pilot’s evidence itself precludes her rationally 
believing that she has enough fuel, nevertheless that evidence makes the proposition that she has 
enough fuel rational for her to believe! Of course, one could define a notion of  ‘evidential support’ 
that worked this way—after all, one can simply define evidential support as not taking into account 
higher-order considerations. But a notion of “rational to believe” which divorces it so completely 
from what could be believed rationally seems to me to have left the topic of rational belief too far 
behind.21 
The motivations for Independence, then, do not really limit us to Restricted-Independence-
style principles which would only prohibit dependence on particular past episodes of reasoning. 
They extend to prohibiting dependence on certain reasoning that the agent might do—and in some 
cases extend to prohibiting dependence on any train of reasoning from the agent’s first-order 
evidence to whatever belief that first-order evidence, considered in isolation, would support. In such 
cases, the agent is in an epistemic position where, precisely because of her evidence, she cannot rationally 
believe the relevant proposition. It seems quite unnatural to say, in such situations, that the agent’s 
evidence makes the relevant proposition rational for her to believe. 22 
                                                 
21 I should note that van Wietmarschen would identify justification to believe with evidential support. Given that 
identification, I would be inclined to resist the claim that higher-order evidence is irrelevant to evidential support. 
 
22 It’s also worth noting that the effect of the higher-order evidence is not just to make it irrational for agents such as our 
pilot to have the beliefs that would be supported by their first-order evidence alone. Our intuitions in such cases also 
support positive rational evaluations of alternative beliefs (or degrees of belief).  So, for instance, in disagreement 
situations such as Ordinary Math Test, when the agent learns of the disagreement of her peer, a credence of .5 seems 




3. Conclusion…the way forward 
 
If all this is on the right track, some sort of Independence principle is a legitimate, and perhaps 
necessary, element in understanding rational responses to higher-order evidence. Saying that does 
not, of course, tell us what such a principle will look like in detail. But in addressing some of the 
concerns that have been raised about the very possibility of legitimate Independence principles, I 
think we have gotten some clues as to what a good formulation might look like. 
 First, it must allow reliability assessments to be informed by facts about certain trains of 
reasoning. Paradigm examples would include the fact that a train of reasoning involved apparent 
discovery and rejection of a decoy answer, or the fact that it was based on evidence likely to prove 
strongly probative on the relevant issue. The challenge is to allow this while precluding reliability-
assessments that depend on certain other facts about the reasoning, such as the fact that it involves 
actual discovery and rejection of a decoy answer, or the fact that it was based on evidence which does 
strongly support a given belief about the relevant issue. As a first step, we should require that the 
reliability-assessment be independent of the targeted reasoning in the sense of not relying on the 
cogency of that reasoning. 
 We’ve also seen that the targeted reasoning should be understood to encompass more than a 
particular past reasoning episode. In many cases, the bearing of higher-order evidence is on possible 
reasoning the agent might do, not just on reasoning she has done. In light of this, I suspect that the 
right way of formulating Independence will involve reference to epistemic support relations, rather 
than episodes of reasoning. As a first pass, we might try something like this: the relevant reliability-
assessment is one that’s supported by the agent’s evidence, when one excludes whatever support 
relations between the agent’s first-order evidence and the proposition in question are such that the 
higher-order evidence suggests that the agent is likely to mis-assess them.  
 Unfortunately, this first pass is not nearly good enough—a lot of questions remain. For 
example: Does it really make sense to divide first-order from higher-order evidence? I think it does 
not, because there will be many cases where the same piece of evidence can play both roles. The 
beliefs of other people, for example, are often evidence at both levels. This suggests that the right 
way to describe the evidential support relations that need to be bracketed is not by reference to what 
pieces of evidence they involve. Instead, we probably need to focus on differentiating first-order 
from higher-order evidential support relations. Roughly, evidence bears on an agent’s doxastic 
attitude toward P in a higher-order way insofar as it bears on that attitude via bearing on how 
reliable an agent should think she is in assessing how evidence bears on her attitude toward P in a 
direct way. That’s the intuitive idea—and it’s not hard to illustrate it with examples. But it’s not really 
a clear formulation. 
                                                                                                                                                             
an epistemic superior (e.g. an expert mathematician), an even lower credence would be more rational. So the role of 
higher-order evidence is not just that of interfering with the rationality of the doxastic response that would be 
appropriate absent the higher-order evidence. Higher-order evidence contributes to the rationality of alternative doxastic 
responses. This does not seem explicable on an account where the higher-order evidence interferes with well-




 A related question is whether one can neatly circumscribe the evidence whose first-order 
support for the relevant proposition needs to be bracketed by the Independent reliability-
assessment. I suspect that again, the answer is no. For example, prospects for circumscribing the 
relevant evidence seem pretty dim when one thinks about disagreements over big issues, such as we 
find in economics or philosophy. And the more holistic we take evidential support to be, the 
dimmer the prospects. My current inclination is to think that the right way of handling this is to 
include all first-order support of the relevant proposition. But I’m not confident that this won’t 
cause trouble. 
 Another question that arises is this: can we cleanly divide cases where the agent has higher-
order reason for self-doubt from ones where the agent has no apparent evidence at all relevant to 
her reliability? Again, the answer seems to be no: surely there is a continuum here. And further along 
the continuum are cases where an agent has positive evidence of her own reliability. So if there isn’t 
really a discrete class of cases where higher-order evidence is relevant, can we find a smooth, unified 
way of handling all cases? I hope so. At this point, the approach that seems most promising to me is 
to posit a degree of self-trust as being warranted independently of any evidence. If that worked out, 
it could provide for rational reliability-assessments even in the absence of specific evidence bearing 
on reliability. 
 Yet another problem concerns cases where higher-order evidence is indiscriminate—in 
particular, when it targets the agent’s ability to reason about higher-order evidence. Some such cases 
seem so close to paradoxical that we might skip over them with relatively clear conscience—but 
others do not. 
 So those are some of what seem to me to be significant obstacles that we face in formulating 
an Independence principle. I’ve sketched some of the directions that seem to me most promising for 
meeting those obstacles. But I’d be lying if I said I felt clear or confident about any of them—there’s 
clearly a lot of work remaining to be done. I personally suspect that in the end, the biggest threat to 
Independence principles does not lie in the sort of counterexample-based or motivational challenges 
we looked at earlier. I suspect that it lies in the difficulty of coming up with a precise version of 
Independence that can address these sorts of questions in a satisfactory way.23  
At this point, I’m convinced that finding an acceptable Independence principle is necessary, 
if we are to describe the most rational way of acting as judge in one’s own epistemic case. Given that 
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